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ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT V-1 WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FREE PRODUCT IN THE SEWER AND THAT THE
EMERGENCY ORDER AND NOTICE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WERE
PROPERLY ISSUED.
A.

The Emergency Order And Notice Of Non-Compliance
Issued By The Executive Secretary (UST) Is Limited By The
Technical Standards Set Forth In 40 C.F.R. Part 280.

The Division of Environmental Response and Remediation ("DERRW), in its Brief
of Respondents, erroneously argues that Utah State law grants the Executive
Secretary (UST) of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, unlimited and
unquestioned power to determine who must step forward and assume the financial
costs of remediating a real or perceived emergency. See Brief of Respondents, 12-24.
The Division further argues, that the reason for this is in the unlikely event the
Executive Secretary's judgment proves fallible, the owner/operator of the underground
storage tank can ask the Board to reallocate the responsibility to another party,
identified by the owner/operator of course, and then sue that party for a refund or
contribution. Id. The apparent basis for this omnipotence vested in the Executive
Secretary is that once an owner/operator has experienced any confirmed release at
its facility, at any time in the past, the Executive Secretary has no further duty to
correctly identify whether the current emergency is caused by those prior events. He
apparently need only cite the prior release and is immediately in compliance with the
Act. Id. This argument is completely without merit and has no basis in law or fact.
The Executive Secretary derives his powers and duties from the Utah
Underground Storage Tank Act ("Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-404 (as amended
1997). Relevant to this case, is section 19-6-420 which states:

v-l\eo\appeal\rcpty .brf
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(1)

/f the executive secretary determines that a release from a petroleum
storage tank has occurred, he shall:
(a)

identify and name as many responsible parties as reasonably
possible.

Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420 (as amended 1997). The statute does not grant the
executive secretary with the power to arbitrarily assign responsibility without valid
factual support. On the contrary, the Act merely grants the Executive Secretary the
power to enforce the rules and requirements of the petroleum storage tank program.
Utah Code Ann. §19-6-404.
The Utah Underground Storage Tank Act requires that the rules made under the
authority of the Act "meet the federal requirements for the state's assumption of
primacy in the regulation of underground storage tanks." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6403(2). The Utah Underground Storage Tank Rules, R311, specifically adopt the
underground storage tank technical standards set forth by the Environmental
Protection Agency at 40 C.F.R. Part 280. Utah Admin. Rule R311-202. There is no
grant of discretion to the Executive Secretary or the Board to elect when or under
what conditions the federal technical standards are applied to the investigation of
petroleum releases and/or spills as the DERR argues in its Brief of Respondents.
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Company, Inc., 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah
App. 1993)(citing King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah
App. 1993)). Further, the Administrative Procedures Act specifically provides for
agency review if an authorized party "contests the validity or correctness of the notice
or order."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(k).

V-1's Request for Agency Action

specifically noted that the rules and standards set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations and adopted and incorporated in the Utah Underground Storage Tank
v-l\eo\appc*l\rcply.brf
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Rules, R311, "do not authorize the [Executive Secretary] to require abatement and
corrective action prior to a determination that V-1 is the source of an off-site impact."
R.012-14.
V-1 makes no attempt to dispute the DERR's statement that "[pletroleum
flowing into a sewer is considered a confirmed release." Brief of Respondents, p.24.
However, such a conclusory finding is clearly insufficient to establish the source
and/or party responsible for the release.

It is essential that the agency make

subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are
focused on and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and
legal basis for that conclusion. U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, 882 P.2d 141, 144-5 (Utah 1994).
The error, as previously identified by V-1, is that the Emergency Order, issued
by the Executive Secretary on January 19, 1996, must be supported by evidence that
establishes that the noxious order in the sewer on Whitney Avenue was caused by
free product petroleum, and that the V-1 facility located on 300 West was responsible
for that product entering the sewer system. R.012-14. The Executive Secretary was
very specific in stating that the emergency he was addressing in his Emergency Order
was "free product in the sewer" on Whitney Avenue. R.005. The Order stated "[a]
recent and/or ongoing petroleum release from V-1 is the source of the free product
infiltrating the sewer line." R.004. V-1 was directed to "investigate the release of free
product... [and] remove and abate free product... impacting the sewer line." R.003;
000117. The investigation commenced by environmental consultants, TriTechnics
Corporation, reported, however, that V-1 was not the likely source of free product in
the sewer on Whitney Avenue. R.644; 000096. The Executive Secretary's Notice of

v-l\eo\appeal\rcply.brf
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Noncompliance, issued five days later, states that because V-1 "fail[ed] to remove and
abate the free product ... impacting the sewer line by January 23, 1996," the
Executive Secretary would proceed with abatement, apparently without further
investigation, and "may" seek to recover its costs of doing so, from V - 1 . R.009;
000122.
Following an evidentiary hearing on February 13, 1997 the Utah Solid and
Hazardous Waste Control Board held that the Emergency Order was "properly issued
under Utah Admin. Code R311-202, which incorporates by reference 40 C.F.R. Part
280."

R.896; 000031.

The Board's Order is based on Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law set forth in its Order dated April 2 1 , 1997. R.901; 000024. The
Board's findings of fact are, however, contrary to the substantial weight of evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.

King v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993), Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4)(g)(1989).
B.

The Board's Findings Of Fact Are Contrary To Substantial
Record Evidence, Incompetent and Arbitrary and Capricious
And Do Not Represent A Mere Recitation Of The Executive
Secretary's Findings.

The DERR also attempts to argue that the "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions
of Law" presented in the Board's Order of April 21,1997 "cannot be attributed to the
Board." Brief of Respondents at 1 1 . The DERR states that "a// of the [] so-called
conclusions that V-1 attributes to the Board were not conclusions but a summary of
the evidence relied upon by the executive secretary in issuing the Emergency Order
and Notice of Noncompliance." Brief of Respondents at 11 (emphasis added). This
is a disingenuous and completely vacuous argument.

v-l\co\appc*l\rtply brf
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First, if the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth by the Board in
its Order merely reflect a recitation of what the Executive Secretary relied on in
issuing his Emergency Order and do not constitute the Board's own findings and
conclusions, the agency action must be reversed as a matter of law.

"An

administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review." LaSal Oil Company,
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 1047 (Utah App.
1992)(emphasis added). "Absent such detailed findings, this court 'cannot perform
its duty of reviewing the [agency's] order in accordance with established legal
principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious
administrative action.'"

Id.

Moreover, the "conclusions" which the DERR does

attribute to the Board1 are vague and conclusory, merely highlighting the fact that the
Board wholly failed to make the appropriate subordinate factual findings that are
required to demonstrate the logical and legal basis for its ultimate conclusion
necessary to enable this Court to conduct a meaningful review. Id. Again, this leads
to the unavoidable conclusion that the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. Finally, the Board makes no reference in its Order to adopting or summarizing the
executive secretary's findings. On the contrary, the Board specifically states: "The

1

The DERR states that the only conclusions reached by the Board are "(1) that the
geoprob and monitoring well data, and other factors support the Executive Secretary's
findings that V-1 is a source of the petroleum contamination found on the V-1
property and which entered the sewer line on Whitney Avenue and therefore the
Emergency Order was properly issued under Utah Admin. Code R311-202, which
incorporates by reference 40 CFR Part 280; (2) that the Executive Secretary complied
with all of the requirements of the Underground Storage Tank Act in issuing the
Emergency Order ...; and (3) the issuance of the Notice of Noncompliance was
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420 (2)(b)." Brief of Respondents at 11.
v-l\eo\appe*l\rcpiy brf
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Board hereby issues its. written findings of fact, conclusions of law, statement of
reasons and ORDER as required by Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-12 with regard to said
Request for Agency Action." R.899; 000026. The Order explains that "Its written
findings of fact, conclusions of law, statement of reasons and ORDER" are the result
of "having considered the testimony, exhibits and arguments of counsel..." R.900899; 000024-25. Nowhere in the Board's decisions does it specifically adopt the
findings of the executive secretary or, for that matter, even make reference to any
findings made by the executive secretary.

R.900-891; 000024-33.

The Board

specifically states that its Order is "[biased upon the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Reasons for Decision..." R.891; 000032.
C.

There Is No Reliable Evidence That V-1 Has Experienced A
"Series" Of Releases At The Salt Lake Facility.

The DERR argues for an entire section of its Brief of Respondents on the correct
definition of a "release" versus a "spill" of petroleum into the environment. Brief of
Respondents at pp. 18-19. However, the entire argument amounts to unnecessary,
incorrect and inconsequential hyperbole. The DERR and the executive secretary
argued to the Board that V-1 had experienced a series of "releases." R.895, 898,
8 4 1 , 809-41; 000026. The record, however, supports no such conclusion.
In support of the executive secretary's allegations that there have been a
"series" of releases at the V-1 facility, the DERR introduced a document, prepared by
the DERR itself, which states that the "first" of these releases occurring at the V-1
facility was the result of a line leak which was reported to the Fire Department in
1985. R.841; 000047. Neither the alleged "report to the fire department" nor the
individual who made the allegation, nor the individual who prepared the DERR report

v-1 \co\appeal\rtply .bff
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were available at the hearing for examination.

R.801 - 4 1 .

As this Court has

previously pointed out, "[dlespite the flexibility of administrative hearings, there
remains the 'necessity of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness
in administrative hearings/" To/man v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28
(Utah App. 1991). Although hearsay evidence may be admissible in an administrative
hearing, the Board's findings of fact "cannot be based exclusively on hearsay
evidence." Hoskings v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah
App. 1996). The president of V-1 Oil Company testified that he had been with the
company for almost 36 years at the time of the administrative hearing and was
completely unaware of any such release occurring at the Salt Lake facility in 1985.
R.714. Each finding of fact made by an administrative agency must be supported by
a residuum of legally competent evidence. Id. The Board's reference to multiple
releases in its Order, not buttressed by a residuum of competent legal evidence, taints
its decision. Id. Moreover, in 1985, there was no Division of Environmental Response
and Remediation or technical reporting requirements, or definitions of what constitutes
a "release." 2 Therefore, the DERR's argument that it recorded or maintained this
information in the regular course of business is without merit.
Mr. Huskinson also testified that, with the exception of the documented release
which V-1 reported to the DERR in December 1995, he was unaware of any
"reportable" release of petroleum at the V-1 station. R.528, 714. Mr. Huskinson did

2

The State of Utah adopted the federal requirements compelling the cleanup and
upgrading of underground storage tanks and enacted the Utah Underground Storage
Tank Act in 1989 originally codified at 26-14e-101 etseq., later renumbered in 1991
to Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-401 et seq. The Act required owners and/or operators to
undergo testing and obtain a certificate of compliance by July 1991. Utah Code Ann.
§ 19-6-412.
v-l\eo\appe*I\fcpty.brf
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testify that in July 1990, Eaton Metals prepared a LUST Release/Spill Report,
specifically noting that during a tank tightness test, the Eaton employee noted
"contamination around the fill pipes, etc."

R.194; 000193.

identified the "type of release" as an "overfill and spill."

The report further

R.294;000193.

The

technical standards of the Code of Federal Regulations identifies a reportable "overfill
or spill" as one that "results in a release of petroleum to the environment that exceeds
25 gallons..." R.528; 000008. As the DERR has so artfully pointed out in its Brief,
this type of release refers to the above ground discharge of petroleum which may
occur when an underground storage tank is being filled. Brief of Respondents at 19.
However, the DERR apparently disputes V-1 's argument that the contamination noted
in July of 1990 was not a "reportable release," and further argues that V-1 is
incorrect in its assumption that a "spill" is the same as a "release" and that an
owner/operator is not required to report a spill unless it exceeds 25 gallons. Id. at 1819.
The relevance of DERR's argument is somewhat vague.3

However, these

above ground spills and overfills are clearly included by both the Utah and the federal
Acts as "releases." 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.12, 280.53. Further, the DERR asserts that
"William Moore, an expert witness for DERR, testified that V-1 is incorrect in
assuming that it only had to report a release if it was 25 gallons or more. R.742."

3

DERR does, however, attempt to use this rationale "that a spill is not the same
as a re/ease" to attack the V-1 President, Mr. Gary Huskinson's, credibility and infer
that V-1 has failed to report underground releases by defining them as less than 25
gallons. Brief of Respondent, at 31-32. This argument has no merit as the DERR has
clearly misquoted both its own witness William Moore and the technical standards
mandated by State and federal statute.
v-1 \eo\appeal\reply .brf
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Brief of Respondents at 19. This is an inaccurate quote and mischaracterizes Mr.
Moore's testimony. William Moore testified:
Q:

... if you have a release of less than 25
gallons, does that mean you can just let it go?
Do applicants have to do anything about it?

A:

No.

Q:

What are you required to do?

A:

Clean it up.

Q:

But I thought this said that you only have to
report it if it exceeds 25 gallons?

A:

You have to report it if it exceeds 25 gallons. You
are still required to clean up the release and remove
the contamination.

Q:

So, is it still a release if it's less than 25 gallons.

A:

Sure.

Q:

What constitutes a release?

A:

Any petroleum that escapes into the environment.

R.741-42, testimony of William Moore, DERR employee (emphasis added). Douglas
Hansen, also a DERR employee, testified:

v-l \eo\appeal\reply .brf

Q:

Is there any indication on this document that
you're relying on that there was any release
on the environment of greater than 25
gallons?

A:

There's no specified amount.

Q:

Okay. The next document that was referred
to, does it document any release on this? []

9
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A:

It doesn't address a specific release, just the
presence of contamination.

R.771; 000064.
The further reports dated in 1991 and 1992 and identified by the DERR as
separate -incidents" of contamination were the result of the DERR's testing and soil
samples taken from the excavation site and investigation of the "spill" identified by
Eaton Metals in July 1990.

R.293.

Examination of Mr. Huskinson by the Board

confirmed that this "release" resulted in the removal of two or three yards of
contaminated soil. R.702; 000081. The remaining references to contamination found
at the facility during various inspections does not support a conclusion that each time
the testing occurred the results documented a separate and distinct incident or
release. There was absolutely no evidence presented to the Board that the V-1 facility
has experienced a "series of releases."
Although there is no evidence that a separate and distinct spill or release
occurred on the dates referred to by the DERR and relied upon at the evidentiary
hearing, the DERR argues that "[t]he incidents referred to in the (V-1 inventory)
reports as inventory losses or staining were all considered releases."

Brief of

Respondents, at 32. The DERR cites to testimony offered by Douglas Hansen of the
DERR who testified "if in the first month if you are over or short above the amount
that's allowed, it's considered a suspected release and needs to be reported." Brief
of Respondents, at 32; R.797.
This is an inaccurate representation of the technical standards adopted by the
Utah Act. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-413, Utah Admin. Code R311-202-1, 40 C.F.R.
§ § 280.43, 280.50. Product inventory control must be conducted monthly to detect

v-1 \co\appeal\reply .brf

10

2/2/98

a release of at least 1.0 percent of flow-through plus 130 gallons.

40 C.F.R.

§280.43(a); R.530; 000008; R.690; 000084. Accurate inventory control, if used as
a method of release detection, must be demonstrated prior to the issuance of an
owner/operator's certificate of compliance. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-413, Utah Admin.
Code R311-202, 40 C.F.R. § 280.40; R.531; 000007. At all times relevant to this
case, V-1 was issued an annual certificate of compliance. R.680; 000087.

The

technical standards adopted by the State of Utah provide that owners/operators who
use the inventory control method of release detection, must report a shortage of
inventory, or "suspected release,"... "when a second month of data" exceeds the
recommended allowable flow-through. Utah Admin. Code R311-202, 40 C.F.R. §
280.50(c)(2); R.690; 000084; R.530; 000008. The technical standards set forth in
the federal regulations and adopted by the Utah Underground Storage Tank Act
specifically contradict the testimony offered by the V-1 employee Douglas Hansen.
R.797.

Further, the relevant statutory provision does not grant the agency the

discretion to arbitrarily reduce the reporting requirement set forth in the technical
standards. Utah Admin. Code R311-202, 40 C.F.R. § 280.50(c)(2); R.690; 000084;
R.530; 000008. No agency enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in it
by the Legislature. Tasters v. Department of Employment Security, 863 P.2d 12, 19
(Utah App. 1993). The agency's discretion in this matter is confined by statute.
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 26 (citing Williams v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 763 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1988)).
DERR continues with further mendacious arguments regarding "releases" at the
V-1 facility, none of which are supported by the record. Brief of Respondents, pp. 3 1 36. DERR states, "V-1 has not disputed that it has never complied with a reporting

v-l\eo\appeaI\reply brf
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and remediation compliance schedule in relation to any of these releases." Brief of
Respondents, p. 34. DERR cites to a Notice of Violation issued by the Executive
Secretary which merely recites this same allegation as support for the argument.
R.284. However, clearly this is an inaccurate statement and disingenuous argument.
V-1's environmental consultant investigated allegations of contamination at the site
in 1991, 4 again in 1994 and 1995 which led to the excavation and removal of two
(2) underground storage tanks, which was both reported and attended by the DERR.
R.279-80.

Further, DERR witnesses confirmed that V-1 even met the reporting

requirements in this instance but refused to assume remediation of the off-site impact
which V-1's environmental consultant advised did not originate with the V-1 facility.
R. 133-36, 644, 650, 465, 616, 804, 895; 000029, 000056, 000094, 000096.
DERR then argues that DERR employee, William Moore, testified that V-1 used an
inventory control method that incorporates "what V-1 considers an allowable leak
rate." Brief of Respondents, p. 35. Again, this is an inaccurate representation of the
testimony elicited at the hearing.

Mr. Moore did not testify regarding what V-1

"thought" or "considered" in this regard. Rather, Mr. Moore actually stated:
Q:

Could you briefly tell us if you saw any
problems with the inventory control methods
or the accuracy of them?

A:

There's a major problem in the accuracy of
the inventory control method. They are
supposed to be measured every one eighth of
an inch accuracy... it's obvious they were not
measuring very accurately ...
The other occasions were indications
that when they did the total overages and

4

R.293.

v-l\co\appcal\itply.brf
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shortages and they calculated their allowables
for several months in a row, their overages
from October and November and December
were over their allowables. And after the
second month of confirming levels over the
allowables, they're supposed to report it to
the division.
The fact that they're over the
allowables at all should send up - even for
one month - should have sent up their own
alarm that they should start to investigate.
The allowable calculated at one percent plus
130 gallons is reporting quantity only, it is not
an allowed leak rate.
R.607-8, 000105, testimony of William Moore, DERR employee.
D.

The Board's Finding That V-1 is Responsible For Free
Product In the Sewer Is Contrary To The Facts In The
Record.
(1) The Only Competent, Scientific Data Presented To
The Board Documented A Significant Groundwater
Flow To The Northeast.

The Board relies on the following finding of fact that:
"A groundwater flow map provided to DERR indicated that
the direction of the regional groundwater flow is slightly
northwest in the direction of the Jordon River... This is the
direction from V-1 to the point where there is petroleum
entering the sewer."
R.895; 000029.

This finding is against the weight of substantial evidence, and

completely ignores the only competent, scientific evidence presented at the hearing.
"We will reverse the Board's decision if we determine that it was 'based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
Harken Southwest Corporation v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180
v-l\eo\*ppeal\reply .brf
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(Utah 1996)(citations omitted). "Nonetheless, in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence, we will not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, competent,
credible evidence to the contrary." Id.
The only "competent, credible evidence" presented to the Board regarding
groundwater flow and velocity on the V-1 property, or in the area of the investigation,
was collected by direct scientific testing of the groundwater across the entire V-1
facility and along the western portion of 300 West where it borders the V-1 property.
R.464-67; 000168-71. That testing established that the groundwater flow across the
V-1 property was clearly to the northeast, toward 300 West, and not Whitney
Avenue. R.650, 465; 000093, 000170.
"The information we have which is the monitor wells that
are installed here, there's a clear gradient to the northeast
and it's a good one foot difference in groundwater over
something like a hundred feet. That's significant gradient
... [s]o I believe the gradient is clear..."
Testimony of George Condrat, registered professional geological engineer in the State
of Utah. R.616, 657; 000093; 000103. The DERR witnesses confirmed that they
had no direct, or scientific knowledge regarding groundwater flow or velocity. R.200,
649-50, 727.
The DERR employed Delta Environmental Consultants to perform the
environmental investigation on behalf of the State.

See Delta Environmental

Consultants, Inc., Subsurface Investigation Report, R.036-210 ("On January 18,
1996, the DERR notified Delta of the situation and Delta personnel visited the site and
began exploring petroleum vapor abatement options." R.206). Delta Environmental
did not undertake to establish groundwater flow or velocity by direct analysis. R.200;
649-50; 727. On the contrary, the Delta Subsurface Investigation Report specifically
v-l\co\appc*l\rcply.brf
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states that

H

[t]he direction of ground water movement is assumed to be to the

northwest, following the topography." R.200. All of the state witnesses 6 further
confirmed the DERR's total lack of direct knowledge regarding groundwater flow in
the area:
Q:

Did you test to determine what
groundwater flow was in that area?

A:

We did n o t . . .

the

Testimony of DERR employee/witness, Douglas Hanson, R.111; 000062.

5

The DERR makes the absurd statement that George Condrat, the registered
geological engineer hired by V-1 to conduct its subsurface investigation, lacks
"complete knowledge of the site and the release ... [because] [h]e was not the person
who performed the testing on the V-1 site..." Brief of Respondents, p. 37. DERR
further identifies the engineer as merely "the office manager for TriTechnics." Id.
This is an irresponsible and disingenuous mischaracterization of the facts and evidence
presented. Mr. Condrat testified to the Board:
Board member:
Was [the investigation] a team
effort or were you a one man
task?
Mr. Condrat:

Well, I manage the work in the
office. I had a fellow that works
for me that directed much of the
day-to-day activities, and there's
at least four other people that
worked on the job.

R.635. Moreover, such a hollow accusation belies the fact that none of the DERR
testifying witnesses "performed the testing at the site." R.034-210. The actual
investigation and testing was performed by Delta Environmental Consultants who filed
reports of its testing and subsurface investigation with the DERR for their review.
R.034-210. DERR even argues in its Brief, Mr. Zahn didn't even visit the site, he
merely reviewed the reports filed by Delta and Mr. Condrat of TriTechnics. Brief of
Respondents, p.30.

v-l\co\*ppeal\rcpIy .brf

15

2/2/98

Q:

Is there an exhibit that we have before us
right now that graphs the top of the water
table for this site?

A:

The only data we have is in V-1's hearing
brief, TriTechnic's reports ...

Testimony of DERR employee/witness, Paul Zahn, R.727; 000075.

v-l\co\appcal\reply .brf

Q:

Okay. One last question. Why didn't you try
to measure groundwater elevation and
establish groundwater flow?

A:

I'm in the underground storage compliance
section, I'm not in the LUST section any
more.

Q:

Would you have an opinion why the division
didn't do that?

A:

Probably because all they had initially - when
they first go in they usually use a geoprobe
and they're not very conducive for measuring
groundwater levels. You need to actually put
full ground monitoring wells in which is what
I understand you are doing now. You need
better information first before you accuse
somebody, so they want to get the initial
information first to support their accusations.

Q:

[V-1 ] was able to establish [groundwater flow]
with six wells or something like that. Can the
state do the same with six or so wells
established?

A:

I'm not in that section any more...I'm the
senior scientist in the division of the
underground storage tank branch anyway, but
I have been out of the LUST section where I
have the knowledge. But I don't know the
particular case close enough when it comes to
the LUST issues.

16

Testimony of DERR employee/witness William Moore, R.602-05; 000106.
The only direct groundwater measurements taken in the area was from the
monitoring wells located on the V-1 property. R.731, 616, 649-50, 465. All of the
witnesses who testified before the Board, both State and V - 1 , confirmed that the only
direct measurement of groundwater flow showed that the groundwater flow on the
V-1 property was clearly to the northeast and nflt "slightly northwest.. the direction
from V-1 to the point where there is petroleum entering the sewer." Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order, R.895; 000029; see also R.898; 000026.
The Board's conclusion that V-1 is "up-gradient from the point at which the
contamination was entering the sewer line," or that "the groundwater flowed in a
slightly northwest direction" from V-1 to the sewer is not "resolved in such a fashion
as to demonstrate that there is a logical [or] legal basis for the ultimate conclusion."
U.S. West Communications v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 882 P.2d 141,
144 (Utah 1994).
The Board's refusal to acknowledge this uncontradicted testimony regarding the
groundwater flow is arbitrary and capricious as well. U.S. West Communications v.
California Packing Corp., 901 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1995). "The law does not invest
the Commission with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard
uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence, as it appears to have done here." Id.
(quoting Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952) cf. DeVas
v. Noble, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 1962)("arbitrary and unreasoning distortions of
justice could occur if courts were permitted to ignore credible and uncontradicted
evidence.") This arbitrary disregard of the established groundwater flow also impacts
the Board's finding that "eight of the [UST facilities located in the general area of the

v-l\co\*ppc*l\rcply.brf
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sewer line] appeared to be down-gradient from the release," and further ignores the
evidence regarding conduits from any or even all of the identified Leaking Underground
Storage Tank ("LUST") Sites. R.251-2.
(2) Investigation Following The Issuance Of The Emergency
Order And Notice of Non-Compliance Clearly Identify
Contaminated LUST Sites "Up-gradient" From Whitney Avenue.
The DERR argues that the Executive Secretary reviewed 14 UST sites in the
general vicinity of the release shortly after the release was reported to DERR. Brief
of Respondents, p. 27. However, the records clearly indicate that Bob Smith first
reported the "smell of thinner in the floor drain," on January 12, 1996. R.262;
000203.

On January 19, 1996, the Executive Secretary issued his Notice of

Violation which simply states, "V-1 is the only known underground storage tank
facility in the area." R.004; 000116. DERR environmental consultant, Delta
Environmental Consultants, Inc., submitted a Subsurface Investigation Report on
February 15, 1996 6 which indicates that only two possible sites were even
considered at that time:

V-1 and the property directly north of V - 1 . R. 145-7;

000189-90. It was not until a year later, on January 28, 1997, that DERR submitted
a document noting 14 UST sites in the general vicinity of Whitney Avenue. R.250-51;
000191-92.
The DERR argues that its research confirmed that only V-1 was a potential
source of contamination in the area. Brief of Respondents, pp. 27-28. However, three
LUST sites were directly up-gradient from the Whitney Avenue sewer given the only
evidence of groundwater flow established at the site. R.250; 000191. The Executive

6

R.210.
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Secretary disregarded these sites because he mistakenly assumed that the
contamination entering the sewer was the direct result of a fresh release occurring at
the V-1 station in December 1995 - only one month prior to the sewer contamination,
and because he relied on the erroneous further assumption that the groundwater flow
was to the northwest as the DERR has clearly indicated by the arrow appearing on
DERR's exhibit entitled "V-1 Oil Vicinity LUST Sites." R.251; 000190 (attached as
Exhibit "J" to Petitioner's Brief).
The Board ignored the fact that even in those cases where the tanks have been
removed from the sites, they remain LUST (leaking underground storage tanks) sites.
R.803-804; 625; 646; 628-29; 000100-101, 000056. The closure does not prevent
contamination already generated by a release from migrating to the sewer on Whitney
Avenue moving in the direction of the groundwater flow. R.803-804; 625; 646; 62829; 000100-101, 000056.

This is the same argument the Executive Secretary

utilized in its argument to the Board that V-1 was responsible for the contamination
due to prior contamination at the site. Brief of Respondents, 39-40. George Condrat,
the TriTechnics geological engineer testified in response to the Board's cross
examination:
Q:

v-l\eo\*ppeal\rcply .brf

Assuming that there is a - that there was
prior contamination on the site prior to the
leak at dispenser number 4, that the leak
actually occurred sometime in the later part of
1995, but that there was some prior
groundwater contamination at the site, is it
possible that as long as it was there for a
period of at least two or three years that it
could have migrated toward it and been
encountered by the sewer on Whitney
Avenue?

19
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A:

For that to happen you would have to have a
gradient to move the contamination, and we
don't see it ...

R.624-25; 000100-101. It is apparent, that even if you assume that the groundwater
flow or gradient changed the moment you moved away from the V-1 property, it
would still require groundwater gradient to move the contamination to the west and
off V-1. R.624-5; 000100-101.
Moreover, both environmental consultants agreed that contaminants may take
"shortcuts" or travel rapidly along conduits, such as a sewer lateral. R.804, 647-8;
000095, 000056. The video clearly demonstrated several open sewer laterals as did
drawings of the sewer line included as an appendices to Delta's report. R.645;
000096.
"Based on Delta'a report and based on my experience, the
sewer line [on Whitney Avenue] is probably leaking, and so
it forms a location where the groundwater isn't going past
it. And so, based on the Delta information, it doesn't look
like it goes past the sewer line in this area here. However,
they haven't looked very carefully at the area to the east of
there. There's really a lack of information, and one
possibility is, is that if there is a lateral extending off to the
north, that it's another conduit. And even though there
may not be product going into the sewer through the sewer
line, it could be moving along the outside of the sewer line
and moving down in this area [of Whitney Avenue]."
Testimony of George Condrat, R.641; 000097.
Douglas Hanson of the DERR testified that the Division initially assumed that
the contamination in the sewer was the result of the release which occurred at V-1
in December 1995. R.804. It was quickly ascertained, however, that in order for
there to be a connection between the V-1 1995 release and the sewer contamination
there had to be a conduit - "the most likely pathway of migration would be maybe
v-l\eo\appeal\rtply brf
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a sewer lateral or something else that hooked into V-1's facility and property..."
R.804; 000056. However, it was quickly learned, that "there was no connection
between the sewer line and the V-1 property ..." R.804; 000056.
(3)

There Is No Evidence That The Contamination
On Southern Pacific Property Migrated From V - 1 .

The DERR argues that there is no evidence to support a conclusion that the
source of the contamination in the sewer originated on the Southern Pacific property.
Brief of Respondents, p. 29-31. However, record evidence confirms that benzene
contamination is higher on the Southern Pacific property than anywhere on the V-1
property.

R.246-49;

000212-15.

Testimony

confirmed that

the

highest

concentrations of benzene should remain near the site of the release. R.612. Further,
DERR's argument that soil samples did not show shallow contamination is not
accurate. Brief of Respondents, p. 29. Testimony of Paul Zahn and Douglas Hansen,
employees of DERR, confirmed that there was no inspection of the site for surface
staining. R.720, 773; 00006, 77. Further, several of the geoprobe soil samples
exhibited significant shallow contamination on the railroad property. R.051-66, 758,
719, 732.

As Richard White, Board member noted in his examination of DERR

employee Douglas Hanson:
Q:

v-l\co\*ppc*l\rcply brf

"There are a number of geoprobe locations
where there were elevated PID concentrations
near the surface, at least the upper samples
that were collected. It appears those upper
samples were collected at a depth or upper
measurements were collected at a depth of
about two feet. If you want to look at GP4,
it would appear to me there's fairly high
concentrations, shallow as compared with the
concentrations of depth at GP 7, GP 8, GP 9.
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Wouldn't those indicate that there's at least
some contamination?
A:

There was some. A couple of those were
over a hundred, which is high, and a typical
flag number.

R.758; 000067.
Mr. Zahn testified that he asked Delta Environmental if there was visual
evidence of staining in the samples; he stated "... in some of the geoprobe what they
told me was, again, it was probably vapors in the soil, wasn't related to the
contamination . . . unfortunately, it didn't take samples . . . it would have been nice
to have taken soil samples there." R.732.(emphasis added).
Mr. Wasden, the station manager testified about his observations of the railroad
property where both diesel and gasoline driven vehicles were refueled, as well as
contaminated snow and garbage from Rick Warner Ford and the city street and several
above ground petroleum storage tanks in the area. R.674-5; 000088.

No tests

where ever run to determine whether the product invading the sewer was gasoline,
diesel fuel, paint thinner or some other petroleum or oil based substance. R.871, 857;
000039, 43.

Richard Bright, Waste Water Collections Manager for Salt Public

Utilities, testified: "... it looked like gasoline or oil substance in [the sewer]." R.871;
000039. Further, the tests that were conducted contradict the Executive Secretary's
finding that the sewer contained any explosive vapors.

R.857, 007; 000115,

000043. Mr. Bright testified that direct testing of the vapors in the sewer "didn't
register, it registered basically .01 on our gas detector... [t]hat's really not much of
a detectable measure." R.857; 000043.

v-1 \eo\appeal\rcply .brf
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Further, there is no support in the record for the DERR's argument that "there
is no evidence that there had been UST's on the [railroad] site." Brief of Respondents,
p. 29. The testimony was that DERR has no record of what, if anything, is buried
under the Southern Pacific property.

Testimony of Douglas Hanson, R.750-51.

Moreover, inasmuch as the DERR prevented V-1 from investigating the property,
TriTechnics was unable to determine groundwater flow or the nature or source of the
contamination on the Southern Pacific property. R.708-10, 492, 496; 000078-80.
Administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that contain only ultimate
conclusions. Adams v. Industrial Commission, 821 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1991). The
Tenth Circuit Court has stated that the "arbitrary and capricious standard requires an
agency's action to be supported by the facts in the record." Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at
1575. The Board's conclusions are against the substantial weight of evidence in the
record as well as arbitrary and capricious. "Agency Action must be set aside 'if the
agency relied on factors which Congress has not intended for it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.'"
Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Insurance Company, 463 U.S.
2 9 , 4 3 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ) . Such is the case here.
II.

THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS DEMANDS THAT AGENCY ACTION
NOT BE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS OR DENY V-1 MINIMAL
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS.
V-1 has argued throughout its initial brief that the Executive Secretary, the

DERR, and the Board have ignored uncontradicted, competent and credible evidence
that is inconsistent with the Board's conclusion that the Emergency Order and Notice
v-l\co\app«d\rcply.bif
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of Non-compliance were properly issued. Petitioner's Brief at 18-22. V-1 has further
argued that the Board's decision is not based on legally competent evidence and is
arbitrary and capricious in endorsing the ultimate conclusion that V-1 is responsible
for free product in the sewer in Whitney Avenue. Petitioner's Brief at 22-38. "[T]he
guaranty of due process ... demands that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to
the object sought to be attained." International Union of Operating Engineers v. Utah
Labor Relations Board, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah 1949); ("decision of Board of
Pardons... is arbitrary and capricious in violation of due process guarantees" Preece
v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994)).
Procedural due process is also violated when a finding of fact is made by an
administrative agency without the support of a residuum of legally competent
evidence. Hoskingsv. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah App.
1996). "Despite the flexibility of administrative hearings, there remains the necessity
of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in administrative
hearings." To/man, 818 P.2d at 28. It arbitrary and capricious for the agency to base
its decision on findings that are not supportable by legalLY competent evidence and
does, therefore, violate due process guarantees. Id.
The DERR argues that the evidence relied upon by the agency to support the
conclusion that V-1 experienced a "series" of releases is not hearsay because they are
"public records." Brief of Respondents, p. 33.

This argument is inaccurate and

disingenuous. The memo prepared, which indicates that a leak occurred at V-1 in
1985, has absolutely no record support. It is an allegation of an event which occurred
more than four (4) years before the agency was created, or agents were even

v-1 \co\appeal\rcpty .brf
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employed to collect such data. Utah Code Ann. 26-14e-101 etseq. (1989)(repealed
and recodified in Title 19). Moreover, the DERR failed to produce the alleged report,
the individual who made the allegation or even the individual who included the
allegation in the DERR memo. R.809-41.
When reviewing the agency's explanation of whether the Executive Secretary
acted properly in issuing the emergency order and order of non-compliance, the
reviewing court must determine whether the agency considered all relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Olenhouse v. Commodity
Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1574 (10th Cir. 1994). The arbitrary and capricious
standard focuses on the rationality of the agency's decision making process and the
rationality of that decision.

Id.

It does, therefore, necessarily implicate our

constitutional guarantees of due process. Id. (the administrative law judge violated the
Fund's due process rights by relying on a scholarly medical commentary which was
not introduced at the administrative hearing and was not made a part of the record.
Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 761 P.2d 572, 575
(Utah App. 1988)); See also Olenhouse, 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994); Tolman, 818
P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991); Hoskings, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1996).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, V-1 Oil Company respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board's Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order dated April 17, 1997.
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